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THE ARMENIAN ROAD TO DEMOCRACY 
 DIMENSIONS OF A TORTUOUS PROCESS 
MARIA RAQUEL FREIRE AND LICÍNIA SIMÃO* 
Introduction 
The post-communist transition of the former-Soviet republics has been as differentiated a 
process as the heterogeneity of the former Soviet empire itself. Moving at different paces and in 
divergent directions, the transition course of these republics has been mixed. Be they Western-
oriented, Russia-dependent or other, the processes of democratisation have neither been linear 
nor irreversible. Situated between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iran in the Caucasus region, 
Armenian policies have reflected its search for a place in what it considers to be a hostile 
regional environment. Overcoming domestic constraints and reinventing power structures to 
accommodate democratic and development needs is, however, a difficult task in a context 
marked by endogenous and exogenous difficulties. 
Map of Armenia 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/armenia.pdf. 
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their comments and insightful suggestions on previous drafts of this paper. 
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This paper looks at the Armenian transition towards democracy, focusing on these internal and 
external dimensions of the process. Internally, we consider the decision-making structures, with 
particular emphasis on the role of leadership, the development of political parties and changes in 
civil society. Externally, our attention is focused on neighbourly relations and external actors, 
including the role of international organisations, particularly the European Union (EU) and its 
privileged instrument, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The duration of the 
transition process and its differentiated phases are also considered of relevance to understanding 
the choices of the political actors and the outcomes of foreign and domestic policies. This 
analysis is framed within a conceptualisation of democracy, which includes the holding of 
multi-party elections (the minimal understanding of democracy according to Schumpeter),1 
political and institutional accountability, the rule of law and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, as well as the development of a strong civil society. 
How does the relationship between Brussels and Yerevan affect the transition process? Does the 
ENP function as a catalyst, or does it generate opposition? And how does the regional context 
affect this process? By seeking answers to these and other questions, this paper aims to clarify 
the democratisation process in Armenia, and the role of the EU in this.  
1. Democratisation as a framework for reform 
Armenia has affirmed its ambition to move towards Western liberal democratic and market 
principles, manifested in concrete steps such as accession to the Council of Europe and the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). This demonstrates a desire for change, albeit a desire 
tempered by contradictions and uncertainty. This commitment has been particularly visible in its 
efforts towards the development of a market economy, through the pursuit of economic 
restructuring2 and in accepting macro-economic reforms in consultation with international 
financial institutions.3 Results have nevertheless been limited due to a lack of experience 
regarding democratisation, which is a wholly new concept to a society used to Soviet 
authoritarian rule for more than 70 years until its independence in 1991. 
The holding of free elections has been seen as the first means of assessing transition efforts. 
However, as in many countries where electoral processes have been held, and despite these 
having been described as complying with international standards, the practices of government 
still fall short of democratic. The weak civic participation, the non-existence of multiparty 
political and civic groupings, and in certain cases, the violation of the fundamental rule of law 
principles, are all manifestations of a lack of democracy. This results in what has been called 
“low intensity democracy,”4 where popular mobilisation is discouraged and the governing 
authorities remain widely discredited. By keeping up an appearance of democracy, the new 
regimes frequently obstruct endogenous and exogenous processes of democratisation.5 This 
                                                     
1 Schumpeter (1952), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London: Allen and Unwyn. 
2 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Armenia to the World Trade 
Organisation, WT/ACC/ARM/23, 26 November 2002 (available at www.wto.org, accessed on 12 March 
2007). 
3 Most notably the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 
4 See Barry Gils et al. (eds) (1993), Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order, 
London: Pluto Press. 
5 Carl Gershman & Michael Allen (2006), “New threats to freedom. The assault on Democracy 
assistance”, Journal of Democracy, No. 2(17), April, p. 37. 
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reality is an example of the dark side of representative democracy, revealing a clear democratic 
deficit.  
An all-encompassing understanding of the concept of democracy is thus fundamental to better 
assess the reach of the democratisation processes. The expectations associated with these 
processes, their demands and often deficient implementation, have however led to reversals, 
demonstrating the difficulties of the post-communist transition – developments that have led 
critics to question the appropriateness of applying a standard democratisation model. The 
argument rests on the fact that, in some cases, this procedure leads to the rise of illiberal leaders, 
and in the extreme might eventually allow civil or inter-state conflict.6  
An assessment of the Armenian path towards democratisation is closely linked to internal 
political options and strategic alignments, inscribed in a wider external framing of where 
Yerevan is located politically, geographically and strategically in a region of divergent interests 
– the Caucasus. These mixed neighbourly relations are marked by the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) 
conflict, rendering the regional setting a complex one. The dispute over the Armenian-populated 
Azeri enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh developed into a fully armed conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan in the final days of the Soviet Union. This de facto independent region inside 
Azerbaijan sought international recognition since the end of the conflict in 1994 and depends on 
Armenian assistance both in political, economic and military terms. As a result Armenia holds 
no official diplomatic relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan and has depended on its other 
neighbours to counterbalance the regional sanctions it suffers. Russia is Armenia’s most 
important partner and good relations with both Georgia and Iran are perceived as an asset in this 
difficult set-up. In addition, the role of other actors in the area, in particular the EU and the 
United States, further complicates the political-economic and security dealings of both national 
and regional policies. 
2. Domestic constraints to democracy and catalysts for change 
Domestic processes of post-communist transition have generally been marked by the 
simultaneous political challenges of state-building and those associated with transition to a 
market economy. In the South Caucasus, while the political dimension usually made use of 
nationalist speeches and was closely linked to the ongoing wars, the economic one was 
translated into ‘shock therapy’ measures that allowed the concentration of wealth in the hands of 
a minority, leading to social polarisation and widespread corruption.7 Governmental instability 
has meant unfinished political, economic and social reforms, leaving the South Caucasus bound 
by heavy Soviet legacies, such as non-functioning bureaucracies, inefficient economies and 
weak and still largely undemocratic institutions.8 Domestically, one of the major challenges has 
been, therefore, to ‘governmentalise’ the executive. As Ashot Khurshusyan points out, 
                                                     
6 See Thomas Carothers (2007), “How Democracies Emerge: The ‘sequencing’ fallacy”, Journal of 
Democracy, N. 1(18), p. 12. See also Edward Mansfield & Jack Snyder (1995), “Democratization and 
War”, Foreign Affairs, No. 3(74), pp. 79-97. 
7 Khatchik Derghoukassian (2006), Balance of power, Democracy and Development: Armenia in the 
South Caucasian regional security complex, Armenian International Policy Research Group, Working 
Paper No. 06/10, January. See also Norman A. Graham & Folke Lindahl (eds) (2006), The political 
economy of transition in Eurasia. Democratization and economic liberalization in a global economy, 
Michigan: Michigan State University Press. 
8 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2006), European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Economic Review of ENP Countries, Occasional Paper, No. 25, June (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/economy_finance). 
4 | FREIRE & SIMÃO 
 
“professional policy making and effective policy management is essential to a successful 
development of the country”,9 more so in a global context of rapid international and regional 
integration. In this context, opportunities for development risk being squandered by allowing an 
elite-driven process to hinder democratisation; a very common feature of regimes in transition.  
Armenia has endured a long and painful history of national survival that is still today reflected 
in social and state dynamics. Its national security strategy reveals a basic need of the state for 
survival, perceiving itself as an isolated country in a hostile environment, and resorting to 
external assistance as a way of strengthening its position.10 Either against the Ottoman Empire, 
or the Islamic forces in Iran and Azerbaijan, the Armenian identity was forged amidst 
nationalist, militarist and religious shields which the NK conflict only ended up reinforcing. As 
Georgi Derluguian points out, “[f]or the Armenians, the question of Karabagh encapsulated all 
their historical sorrows and became the symbolic substitute for the much larger trauma of the 
1915 genocide and the loss of historical Armenian lands that remained under Turkey’s 
control.”11 
Amidst such fears, the democratisation of domestic politics where opposing and dissident voices 
can be heard, has been limited. In addition, a growing militarisation of the Armenian state has 
been accepted as a “natural and not particularly dangerous” trend, although at some point it 
raises the question of how far the military has become an agent of regime security rather than 
national security.12 The Armenian diaspora also emerges, at times, as a blocking force, with its 
images of a militarist and victorious state that largely distort the domestic realities. In this 
setting, inputs and frameworks for democratisation have been few, and largely undermined by 
national security issues pushing for hard rhetoric. This rationale for national security is deeply 
rooted in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and in its implications, with the implicit feeling of 
isolation which prevents Armenia from grasping the political and economic opportunities 
presented by the international and regional contexts.  
The powerful Armenian elites have found support in two important sources, the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, which bolsters nationalist feelings and the diaspora, which is an important 
source of revenues and international pressure. A joint Armenian and Azeri publication on the 
NK conflict points out that the  
Karabakh conflict became a factor in the (early or late) formation of the new national elites 
claiming political power in Azerbaijan and Armenia and even in the NK. […] The leaders 
[in both countries] have forever become hostages to the nationalist slogan and sentiments, 
                                                     
9 Ashot Khurshusyan (2003), “Decision Making Process in Armenia legislature” (available at 
www.policy.hu/khurshud/Final_paper.doc). 
10 Armenia adopted a new Security Strategy on 8 February 2007, the first since independence, stating the 
country’s threats and challenges and the priorities to confront them. The document builds on the concept 
of complementarity and underlines the importance of democracy and good governance to sustainable 
development as the basis of reforms. See www.mil.am for the original document in Armenian. See also 
“Armenian Security Strategy approved” (2007), 8 February (available at www.armeniadiaspora.com, 
accessed on 9 February 2007). 
11 Georgi Derluguian (2003), Bourdieu’s secret admirer in the Caucasus. A world-system biography, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 189. 
12 Richard Giragosian (2006b), Repositioning Armenian Security and Foreign Policy within a region at 
risk, Armenian International Policy Research Group, Working Paper No. 06/07, March. 
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and not only because of necessity but also preceding from the fact that continuation of the 
conflict assured personal power.13  
Moreover, the war over Nagorno-Karabakh also constrained the foreign policy choices of the 
Armenian elites since internal legitimacy (including the Diaspora) was directly connected to 
maintaining support to Karabakh authorities, eliminating any possibility of rapprochement with 
Turkey, or of diminishing dependence on Russia.14 An attempt to define an Armenian national 
security concept by President Ter-Petrosyan’s Armenian Pan-National Movement (APNM) in 
the first years of independence, followed on the nationalist tradition developed in the final years 
of the Soviet Union, calling into question a vision of aggressive Pan-Turkism and underlining 
the benefits of normalising relations with Turkey.15 This was a particularly sensitive issue for 
the diaspora, particularly those who left the motherland to move away from the convulsions that 
marked the end of the Ottoman Empire and to whom the claim of genocide recognition by 
Ottoman Turkey is crucial in the national identification processes. The nationalist, conservative 
and communist parties also perceived this to be an option that could upset Russian policy 
makers. This eventually proved unsustainable. The domestic perception was deeply linked to 
the feeling of isolation and threat that had kept the country united, and that would definitely be 
reflected in the exercise of power. 
The constituencies behind Armenian leaders, from Levon Ter-Petrosyan to Robert Kocharian 
have been connected to NK: the former emerged with the first opposition movement to the 
Communist Party of Soviet Armenia, after NK asked Moscow to be integrated within Armenia, 
fully supported by important groups of the diaspora in Moscow. As for Kocharian, he was 
President of NK and has also been elected President of Armenia with support from the most 
influential parties in Armenia, namely the Republican Party, the nationalist party 
Dashnaktsutiun, veteran diaspora-based Ramkavar-Azatakan and Orinats Erkir.16 These clan-
based political power elites were the ones to seize economic power in independent Armenia, 
maintaining it from then onwards, and enjoying support from the military.17  
The new elites in independent Armenia, very much like in most of the post-Soviet countries, 
have accumulated political and economic power, an accumulation that directly impacts on 
                                                     
13 Ali Abasov & Haroutiun Khachatrian (2006), Karabakh conflict. Variants of settlement: Concepts and 
realities, 3rd ed. Baku-Yerevan: Areat/ Noyan Tapan, p. 22.  
14 In the first years after the dismissal of the Soviet Union, the United States pushed for a new role for 
Turkey in the South Caucasus. Armenia, however, would reject Turkey’s pressure to stop supporting the 
Karabakhs, due to fears that this would de-legitimise the new leadership. See Gevork Ter-Gabrielian & 
Ara Nedolian (1997), “Armenia: Crossroads or fault line of civilizations”, International Spectator, No. 2 
(32), p. 98. 
15 Stephan H. Astourian (2001), “From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership change in Armenia”, in 
Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, p. 23. It should be noted that 
the remittances of the diaspora are central to balance the trade deficit and the GDP, as well as for 
supporting domestic and private consumption levels, having direct impact in Armenia’s finances. See 
Leila Alieva (2000), “Reshaping Eurasia: Foreign policy strategies and leadership assets in post-Soviet 
South Caucasus”, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, p. 15 and 
European Commission (2005), staff working paper, Country Report on Armenia. 
16 Ara Tadevosian (2002), “Kocharian Confident of Second Term”, Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 159, 
12 December (available at  www.ipwr.net, accessed on 19 January 2007).  
17 Liana Minasian (1999), “The role of the army in Armenia’s politics”, Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 
5, 4 November (available at www.ipwr.net, accessed on 19 January 2007). See also ICG (2004), 
“Armenia: Internal instability ahead”, Europe Report, No. 158, 18 October, on the most powerful clan-
based political elites in Armenia. 
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decision-making, hampering any moves that might jeopardise acquired rights, including the 
process of liberal democratic transition. As with political accountability and representation, the 
implementation of a market economy has to be accompanied by the necessary checks and 
balances to assure procedural transparency working under a legitimate legal framework, which 
has not been in place. Aware of these fundamental shortcomings, those connected to political 
power have been exploiting these limitations as an opportunity for the reinforcement of their 
own power and influence. Nevertheless, this concentration of economic power in the inner 
circles connected to President Kocharian has been denounced, and in response to domestic and 
external pressures the government has devised an anti-corruption strategy,18 which can be seen, 
partly at least, as a strategy to keep up an appearance of democracy. Implementation is still 
largely dependent on government-controlled bodies, and thus subject to further interference. 
Reform of the judiciary in this context becomes a priority to break cycles of dependence and 
patronage and help root democratic processes. Complaints have been on the rise in Armenia 
regarding the power of oligarchic groups, harassment and unfair competition in political and 
economic terms, and increasing governmental pressure on supposedly independent media and 
reporting.19 The context of political violence adds an element of fragility to the rooting of 
democracy. There was a serious incident in 1999, when gunmen entered the Parliament 
building, shooting Prime-Minister Vezgen Sarkisian and other politicians, including former 
presidential candidate Karen Demirchian.20 The recent attempt to shoot the Mayor of Yerevan is 
another example of an event incompatible with the goal of consolidating democracy. It is even 
more compromising that events such as these were never explained in public nor judged in 
court, indicating that the rule of law is not above political and economic power. A perception of 
impunity for such ‘criminal politics’ prevails, particularly in the higher economic and political 
sectors; a tendency that threatens to undermine state authority and legitimacy.21 Furthermore, 
the abusive use of force by the state authorities after the 2003 Presidential elections, when 
protesters demonstrating in the streets of Yerevan to denounce the ballot as rigged faced forced 
dispersion by the army, can also be seen as an attempt at the legitimisation of violent practices.  
The interconnections between an independent judiciary and the development of a democratic 
state are acknowledged. In 2004, a survey conducted in Armenia, revealed that only 12% of 
Armenians participating considered that the judiciary was not influenced by political power.22 A 
realisation that the very basic foundations of a democratic state in Armenia are still very tenuous 
and an acknowledgement that “people need to think democratically before acting 
                                                     
18 For more information see Transparency International Armenia (www.transparency.org). 
19 David Petrosian (2001), “Armenian media law sparks protest”, Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 66, 19 
January (available at www.ipwr.net). Human Rights Watch (2007), World Report 2007. Events of 2006, 
p. 350 (available at www.hrw.org). Gegham Vardanian (2006), “Armenia: Climate of Self-Censorship”, 
Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 369, 7 December (available at www.ipwr.net, all accessed on 19 
January 2007). 
20 For an assessment of the political linkages and implications of this episode see Mikael Danialian 
(1999), “A disaster for democracy just waiting to happen”, Caucasus Reporting Service, 29 October 
(available at www.iwpr.net, accessed on 19 January 2007). 
21 Richard Giragosian (2006a), “Democracy building blocks: Judicial reform and the rule of law”, 
Armenianow.com, No. 47 (217), 15 December (available at www.armenianow.com, accessed on 5 
January 2007). 
22 IFES Survey (2004), “Citizens’ Awareness and Participation in Armenia”, p. 13 (available at 
www.ifes.org). See also Babken V. Babajanian (2005), “Civic participation in post-Soviet Armenia”, 
Central Asian Survey, No. 24 (3), September, p. 267. 
THE ARMENIAN ROAD TO DEMOCRACY | 7 
 
democratically”.23 This is closely connected to the profound change in social perceptions and 
habits, and with the idea of the development of a democratic culture being rooted in a vibrant 
civil society. This has been mostly perceived by foreign actors as complying with the Western 
model of civic organisation and participation. However, the post-communist reality inherited by 
Armenia, like in most of the former Soviet-area countries, was that of a social network based on 
private and kinship connections, a so-called ‘economy of favours’ – […] used by people to gain 
access to institutional resources, obtain goods and services, secure their civil rights and 
influence decision-making”.24 It is essentially these features that marked the relationship 
between the new independent states and their populations.  
This type of social organisation reflects the popular perception of the state and the distance 
between formal institutions and social dynamics. Since social exchanges concentrated on 
community needs they were never contextualised in the broader framework of state 
development, such as civil society organisations or political parties. The links between 
governmental structures and society were therefore undermined.25 But despite the disconnection 
between state structures and society, the nationalist mobilisations in Armenia that followed the 
revolutionary period between 1988 and 1991 marked a gradual rapprochement between society 
and the political leaders. The excitement of a new national project, however, failed to deliver 
democratic results as the legacies of the Soviet period and the difficult strategic environment of 
the region led to the development of a presidential regime, with extensive power over the 
Executive and the Parliament, in a political system marked by appeasement and intrigues.26  
It might be argued, though, that the presence of a large Armenian diaspora in Russia and in 
Western countries meant that, in the early years of post-communist independence, Armenia 
“had to maintain its adherence to the global trends of democratisation and openness, a very 
difficult task, given the internal political crisis affecting the governability of society.”27 This 
task was also crucial to the maintenance of regional equilibrium in a context of conflict. 
However, the final ruling years of Ter-Petrosyan were already marked by authoritarian trends, 
with democratic compliance revealing rather more rhetoric than substantial content.28 During 
Ter-Petrosyan’s rule, Armenia developed the pattern of authoritarianism and political pressure 
that still marks the regime today.29   
According to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR), Armenia has 
registered an improvement in its electoral procedures from 1996 onwards, mostly on account of 
better access to information and positive synergies from the presence of international monitors. 
Overall, however, Armenia missed the opportunity to make elections a barometer of its 
commitment to democracy.30 Several problems in electoral processes have repeatedly been 
reported, including unbalanced media coverage and inadequate use of public funds; the presence 
                                                     
23 Interview with Armen Liloyan, Head of the European Union Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Armenia, Yerevan, 10 May 2006. 
24 Alena Lebedeva (1998), Russia’s economy of favours, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, cited 
in Babken V. Babajanian (2005), op. cit., p. 267. 
25 Babajanian, op. cit., p. 267. 
26 Leila Alieva (2000), op. cit., p. 12.  
27 Gevork Ter-Gabrielian & Ara Nedolian (1997), op. cit., p. 113. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Stephan H. Astourian (2001), op. cit., p. 43.  
30 Sabine Freizer (2005), “Armenia’s emptying democracy”, 30 November (available at 
www.crisisgroup.org, accessed on 19 January 2007). 
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of government officials and unauthorised personnel at the polling stations; manipulation of the 
vote of the military; dismissal of a large number of complaints without investigation; technical 
and organisational shortcomings connected to the constitution of electoral commissions and 
accuracy in the voters’ lists.31 In general these problems have led to a decline in public trust in 
democratic processes, consequently lowering the number of voters and weakening the minimum 
requirements of a functioning democracy.32  
In spite of all these difficulties, Armenia has nevertheless been showing signs of growing 
democratic awareness and making concrete efforts towards a democratisation process. These 
have, nevertheless, been pursued mainly through the framing of reforms promoted by external 
actors on the basis of the balance between positive and negative conditionality. Before the 2005 
constitutional referendum, the Armenian National Assembly consulted with the Council of 
Europe Venice Commission on the drafting of the proposal. Major issues under revision related 
to the appointment of an Ombudsperson, guarantees of independence and plurality of the media, 
independence of the judiciary, separation of powers and local self-government – all understood 
as irreplaceable steps towards meeting European standards.33 In its report, the Council of 
Europe’s Commission addressed the urgent need to assure implementation of its proposals, with 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe assuming the task of monitoring 
Armenia’s reforming efforts. In December 2006, an extensive report on these developments was 
released, aiming already at the next parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007 and 2008 
respectively.34 These changes, together with the reforms promoted by external actors like the 
EU and the US, are expected to push Armenia closer to democratic standards of civic 
participation. Moreover, the recent adoption of the ENP Action Plan, with measures envisaged 
regarding democratisation,35 might help promote beneficial changes in the political and social 
landscape of Armenia.   
3. External vectors: Neighbourly relations, external actors and the role 
of international organisations 
Parallel to this difficult internal course, post-Soviet Armenia has been facing several challenges 
in the definition and consolidation of an independent foreign policy that serves the country’s 
interests. The main priorities of the first independent government, led by President Levon Ter-
Petrosyan, included the normalisation of neighbourly relations, with special emphasis on the 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan. The Karabakh conflict, the 
consequent trade embargo imposed by Turkey in 1993 and the difficulties associated with the 
post-independence process have left Armenian society and state structure in too frail a condition 
to undertake reforms. Hard negotiations over the Karabakh conflict led to the President’s 
resignation and new elections in 1998 brought to power the former NK President and then 
                                                     
31 See http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1999/05/1216_en.pdf; http://www.osce.org/documents/ 
odihr/1998/04/1214_en.pdf; http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1996/09/1207_en.pdf.  
32 IFES Survey (2004), op. cit. 
33 Venice Commission (2005), “Opinion on constitutional reform in the republic of Armenia”, adopted at 
64th Plenary Session, Venice, 21-22 October, (available at http://www.venice.coe.int/, accessed on 14 
November 2006). 
34 PACE’s Monitoring Committee (2006), “Honoring of obligations and commitments by Armenia”, 
Draft Resolution adopted at Paris meeting, 13 December (available at http://assembly.coe.int/, accessed 
on 16 December 2006). 
35 EU/Armenia ENP Action Plan (available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ 
armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, accessed on 18 January 2007). 
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acting Prime-Minister Robert Kocharian. The main foreign policy lines were maintained, and 
the integration of Armenia into the international community was underlined by the new 
government as a strategic goal,36 opening up a new opportunity for Armenia to break out of its 
isolation. Adding to this objective, after September 11th, 2001 Armenia formulated the concept 
of ‘complementarity’ as a formula to accommodate links to Russia, regional interests and the 
new proximity policy to Euro-Atlantic structures.  
Patterns of enmity and rivalry have dominated the potential space for regional cooperation. Each 
of the South Caucasus states has a different understanding of its neighbours.37 Armenia has no 
diplomatic relations with neighbouring Azerbaijan due to the outbreak of war in NK, and a 
constant animosity marks official speeches and public opinion, strongly influencing national 
politics. Relations with Georgia are not easy, but have a functional character: given the NK 
conflict and the Turkish embargo, Yerevan has depended on Georgia for land connection with 
Russia, Armenia’s major trade partner and energy supplier. Other issues of concern in bilateral 
relations with Georgia relate to the Javakheti region in southern Georgia and the Armenian 
minority living there, as well as to the development of regional economic and energy projects, 
such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the railroad linking Turkey to Azerbaijan via Georgia 
or the Transcaspian pipeline, all bypassing Armenian territory. What level of solidarity Yerevan 
is expecting from Tbilisi is not clear, but it is obvious that the main beneficiary from Armenia’s 
situation is Georgia.38 Armenia therefore regards the development of strategic relations between 
Georgia and Azerbaijan with caution and has looked for assurances from Tbilisi that new 
dividing lines will not be drawn in the southern Caucasus.39  
Two other crucial players in the South Caucasus are of course Turkey and Iran. After the fall of 
the Soviet Union, both tried to reassert power in the region by drawing on ethnic and religious 
factors. As Turkish-Azeri relations developed on a basis of ethnic solidarity, mainly directed 
against Armenia, Iran became a crucial partner in maintaining the regional balance of power. 
But Tehran’s situation is also complicated, suffering sanctions from the US for a long time and 
currently sanctioned over its nuclear programme, under a United Nations Security Council 
resolution. Iran’s early strategy towards the South Caucasus was defined by three main aspects: 
development of strong economic ties; an attempt to take on the role of mediator in the NK 
conflict, and so avoid it from spreading to its own multi-ethnic society; and cooperation with 
Russia on defence, strategic and economic issues, mainly to counter Western influence.40 In this 
perspective, relations with Azerbaijan are important to Iran due to a vast Azeri population living 
in the north of the country, while Armenia is also an important partner with whom Iran enjoys 
amicable political relations, and has gradually come to support fully, looking to maintain 
regional balance. Uncertainty about a possible US strike on Iran is causing concern in the South 
                                                     
36 Tiffany G. Petros (2003), Evolution of Armenia's Foreign Policy, Armenian International Policy 
Research Group, Working Paper No. 03/13, pp. 3-4. 
37 Khatchik Derghoukassian (2006), op. cit. 
38 Interviews with senior Armenian Officials, Yerevan, May 2006. Main arguments were related to 
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the region. 
39 “Oskanian and Bezhuashvili discuss regional issues” (2007), Armenia Diaspora, 16 January (available 
at www.armeniadiaspora.com, accessed on 18 January 2007). 
40 Aghasi Harutyunyan (2006), Neighborhood relations between the EU and Armenia, Centre for EU 
enlargement Studies, Central European University, Budapest, June.  
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Caucasus. A recent survey in the region points to the drastic consequences for Iran’s neighbours 
if war erupts, further destabilising the region.41 The enforcement of sanctions against Iran might 
impact on Armenia, deepening its isolation in terms of trade, transport and energy. The 
inauguration of a gas pipeline linking Armenia to Iran serves the national strategy of energy 
diversification, diminishing dependence on Russian energy coming through Georgia. However, 
not only did Russian Gazprom move to buy its way into a monopoly position in the Armenian 
natural gas distribution network, to control Iranian gas entering the country,42 but current UN 
sanctions on Iran further complicates Armenian calculations, constituting a source of concern.43  
Russia’s hold on the South Caucasus is, at this point, reduced to Armenia. Relations with 
Georgia have reached one of the lowest points in history, particularly after the ‘Rose 
Revolution’, and even Azerbaijan, a moderate ally of Moscow has started to show signs of 
growing independence.44 Using energy as leverage this winter, Baku has resisted Moscow’s 
attempt to raise prices over gas, and supported Georgia in doing the same. This has come as a 
hard blow for Russia’s attempt to constrain Georgia into dependence and to destabilise 
President Saakashvili’s pro-western government, as well as to keep an important ally in Baku. 
President Robert Kocharian and Russian President Vladimir Putin have met frequently and there 
seems to be a consolidation of the relationship between the two countries.45 As Russian 
financial and economic interests grow in Armenia, the authoritarian tendencies in Moscow are 
also reproduced in Yerevan, demonstrating how Russia aspires to represent an alternative model 
to the West in the region. The US has made it clear to the Armenian authorities that closer ties 
with Washington will be conditional upon a free and fair electoral process, and together with the 
EU, Washington is using this momentum to push for compromises in NK, supporting high level 
talks between the two sides.46 However, Russia is a central player in the area, with leverage over 
the NK conflict. It is also part of the Minsk Group, under the OSCE auspices, and responsible 
for mediation of the conflict, together with the US and France. Russian interests towards the 
conflict have been described as “maintaining stability and peace in the region”, though not 
necessarily meaning the resolution of the conflict.47  
In addition, Russia is central to Armenian security, since Yerevan is part of the CIS, and part of 
the Collective Security Treaty. This has allowed for substantial transfers of military equipment 
to Armenia, namely from the closure of the Russian military bases in Georgia, and for the 
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maintenance of Russian military at the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Iranian borders. 
Moves that, according to the Armenian authorities, do not represent any relevant change to the 
existing military balance in the area. In fact, there is a very careful handling of this issue by the 
authorities in Yerevan that underline the non-threatening character of these moves as a way of 
minimising any negative effects that might arise.48   
Besides political-security issues, a new and growing area of Russian influence in Armenia is in 
the economy. As has happened in most of the former Soviet countries, Russia is using its energy 
power and growing financial capacity to reassert its influence. Russian capital has been invested 
in Armenian telecommunications, banking system and electricity networks;49 it holds a 
monopoly position in the gas distribution network, and in order to prevent doubling of gas 
prices coming from Russia, Armenia has granted Gazprom a share in its largest thermal power 
plant.50 These moves have repeatedly been denounced by opposition leaders as an attempt by 
the “authorities [to] try to preserve their illegitimate power by selling out the nation’s economic 
facilities.”51 
It seems, therefore, that the inputs for democratic consolidation coming from the wider regional 
context around Armenia are very weak. Conflict has impoverished societies and weakened 
states, making democratic reforms a second-line goal, and there are no strong democracies to 
push the South Caucasus countries irreversibly towards a democratic option, as was the case in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The events in Georgia that brought to power a government with 
large popular support after the ‘Rose Revolution’ have not been replicated in Armenia. The 
benefits of maintaining a ‘declaratory democracy’ have sufficed for Armenia to keep some level 
of support from and engagement with the West, though it is not clear how valid this strategy 
might prove to be in the ENP context. Russia, the strongest of the regional actors, can be 
increasingly seen as a counterweight to the growing democratic conditionality applied by the 
West, which it understands as clear interference in an area of vital interest for Moscow. 
Western influence and conditionality comes mostly through United States’ bilateral aid, NATO 
and the pan-European institutions such as the EU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE. 
Particularly since September 11, the US has become an important actor in the South Caucasus. 
The 2002 annually-renewable national security waiver on the prohibition of aid to Azerbaijan 
allowed for military cooperation to be boosted with Baku and Yerevan on account of fighting 
terrorism.52 This was further reinforced by financial assistance granted to Armenia for a five-
year period, under the Millennium Challenge Account, against assurances by Foreign Minister 
Oskanian that “Armenia would address democratisation shortfalls”, reported during the 2005 
Constitutional referendum.53 However, monitoring of the upcoming elections period by 
international organisations, such as the OSCE, might not be sufficient to guarantee the 
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fulfilment of international standards of free and fair elections. Internal shortcomings mingle 
with international efforts, clearly showing the uphill struggle democratisation has been facing in 
Armenia. Other issues, such as security, trade and investment, have been privileged areas for US 
assistance, bearing in mind the strategic location of the South Caucasus as a buffer zone 
between Europe and Middle East extremism, a spearhead for influence in Central Asia, and a 
route for energy and trade linking Europe to Asia.  
Support for military reforms, integration into NATO structures and the funding of energy 
projects represent significant changes in US foreign policy for the region as a whole and are 
welcomed by Armenia, conferring an added leverage to US conditionality. Nevertheless, 
support for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the most visible outcome of the alignment 
between the US, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, was expected to lead to a countervailing 
union between Russia, Armenia and Iran.54 This understanding, however, did not completely 
follow through. Armenian-Turkish relations improved as a result of the Turkish process of EU 
membership and due to growing pressure, particularly from business groups to normalise 
relations and re-open the Turkish-Armenian border.55 At the same time, Iran is increasingly 
under pressure and is therefore becoming an unstable partner for Armenia, at a time when their 
relations have been quite close. The volatility of the situation is already very high, and the 
involvement of external players further sets in motion new dynamics which are not easy to 
follow. It seems the East-West axis is closer, as can be seen in the growing Turkish and Azeri 
assertiveness in the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad project put forward without US financing. 
Armenia, through its ‘complementarity’ foreign policy has been trying to balance its vital 
interests with Russia, the West and Iran, but this is an unsatisfactory strategy as the gulf 
between these different actors grows deeper.  
In addition, this is a strategy that can also be understood as a way to accommodate conflicting 
domestic views over Armenian foreign policy priorities. One such view pertains to the soothing 
of Moscow’s fears of its diminished military influence in its own backyard after September 11. 
NATO enlargement and the new European Neighbourhood Policy envisage extending the Euro-
Atlantic structures to the South Caucasus and thus bringing these countries further under the 
influence of the US and the EU. There is a relevant constituency in the Armenian government, 
very close to Russia, that perceives the national interest as maintaining a balance more 
favourable to Moscow than to the West. This can be seen in the reluctance of Armenian officials 
to declare NATO membership as a national strategic objective. Thus, considering the growing 
Russian economic influence, one could argue that this small circle in the political elite has seen 
this to be an important opportunity to increase its financial and economic power, and finds in 
Russia a strong ally capable of assuring political support even under growing charges of 
illegitimacy.56 These trends have been denounced by opposition figures in Armenia that 
perceive it as contrary to the national interest.  
                                                     
54 Ozden Z. Oktav (2005), “American Policies towards the Caspian sea and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline”, Perceptions, No. 1(X), Spring, pp. 20-21. 
55 Syuzanna Vasilyan (2006), “The policy of regional cooperation in the South Caucasus”, Centro 
Argentino de Estudios Internacionales, pp. 32-33 (available at www.caei.com.ar, assessed on 17 January 
2007). 
56 Richard Giragosian (2003), Geopolitics and the formation of foreign policy in the South Caucasus: An 
examination of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, Armenian International Policy Research, p. 8. 
THE ARMENIAN ROAD TO DEMOCRACY | 13 
 
4. Relations between the EU and the South Caucasus 
EU involvement through the ENP was an added factor in pushing for reforms. As Michael 
Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva have pointed out, “European integration is a distant but 
conceivable prospect; integration with the US is not”.57 Identification with Europe through 
historical ties and a sense of unprecedented opportunity for economic integration, as well as 
political support from a strong and reliable partner directly involved with Armenia’s most 
problematic neighbours, was central to the decision to enhance relations with the EU. In fact, 
the extension of the ENP to the countries of the South Caucasus renders the EU a privileged 
partner for the promotion of regional cooperation.58 In addition, Turkey’s negotiations for EU 
accession are seen in Armenia as a possibility for normalisation of relations, with implications 
at the wider regional level. Therefore, the lack of progress in the enlargement process with 
Turkey is likely to have negative effects in the rapprochement between Armenia and the EU, 
and in their relations with Russia.59 
The inclusion of the South Caucasus countries in the ENP underlines the importance that 
stabilisation and conflict resolution in the region have for European security in general, as 
pointed out in the European Security Strategy.60 Moving from a framework that marked the first 
years of relations between the EU and independent CIS countries, stabilisation evolved from 
development assistance under the TACIS programme, to Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements, centred on closer political and economic dialogue, and to the most recent ENP 
Action Plans, reflecting a willingness to better coordinate efforts and policies towards the 
region.61 This all-encompassing policy is meant to signal the political will inside the EU for a 
deeper commitment to the South Caucasus, bringing the neighbouring regions of the Union to 
some level of integration that would replicate, at least partially, the democratisation and 
liberalisation effects resulting from the enlargement policy. This is not without a great deal of 
uncertainty. In fact, Armenian representatives acknowledge the difficulty in pursuing the 
process of democratisation smoothly in the face of harsh conditions both at home and in the 
neighbourhood. Though the potential is there, it has also not been used to the utmost, both due 
to inadequacy of external procedures and the non-readiness of domestic structures.62   
                                                     
57 Michael Emerson & Gergana Noutcheva (2004), Europeanisation as a gravity model of 
democratisation, CEPS Working Document No. 214, CEPS, Brussels, November, p. 17. 
58 Interviews with Armen Liloyan, Head of the European Union Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Armenia, Yerevan, 10 May 2006; Valery Mbrtannian, Director, International Organisations Department, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Yerevan, 10 May 2006; Garik Adamyan, Director of the TACIS 
National Coordination Unit at the Ministry of Finance and Economy, Yerevan, Armenia, 9 May 2006. 
59 “Turkey is the country that pushes us all the time towards Russia. It is an abnormal attitude that the 
national security of our country is greatly related to Russia”, Interview with Karen Bekaryan, Chairman 
of NGO European Integration, Yerevan, 11 May 2006.   
60 European Security Strategy (2003), “A secure Europe in a better world”, Brussels, 12 December.  
61 Maria Raquel Freire & Licinia Simão (2006), “Политика ЕС в отношении республик Закавказья: В 
поисках общего в неоднозначной ситуации” (“The EU’s Neighborhood Policy towards the Southern 
Caucasus: Searching for Commonalty in a Patchy Scenario”), Comparative Constitutional Review 
Journal, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 136-144 (in Russian); and Yelda Demirag (2004-05), “EU policy towards 
South Caucasus and Turkey”, Perceptions, No. 4 (IX) winter, p. 96. 
62 Interviews with Armen Liloyan, Head of the European Union Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Armenia, Yerevan, 10 May 2006; Garik Adamyan, Director of the TACIS National Coordination Unit at 
the Ministry of Finance and Economy, Yerevan, Armenia, 9 May 2006. 
14 | FREIRE & SIMÃO 
 
Major issues in the enlarged EU neighbourhood are linked first and foremost to the so-called 
‘frozen conflicts’ of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. This situation of 
permanent conflict has impacted on the way South Caucasian people perceive their societies and 
political institutions, and is responsible for weak economic performance, both due to 
mismanagement and corruption, and to the missed opportunities for development. The EU has 
recognised the damaging effect of the conflicts on stabilisation and democratic and economic 
development of the area. The appointment of a Special Representative for the South Caucasus 
(EUSR) in 2003 signalled an intention to play a more significant role in conflict resolution in 
the region.63 It has, however, been received with some scepticism in Yerevan. Formally the EU 
involvement is understood as increasing, as the broadening of the Special Representative’s 
mandate reveals, but in practice the Armenian authorities understand it as too vague for concrete 
accomplishments and not adding fundamentally to further advances in the NK conflict. In 
addition, they regret the fact that there is no EU resident ambassador in Yerevan.64 The views 
expressed by Armenian diplomats in Brussels, more than a year after the new EUSR began his 
functions are somehow different, revealing a more positive approach to Ambassador Semneby’s 
new competencies and to his support of the Minsk group’s activities, according to the wording 
of his mandate.65  
International pressure coordinated with other international organisations like the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe has, nevertheless, evidenced some advances in the NK negotiations, and in 
developing incentives for democratic reforms. The period leading up to accession to the Council 
of Europe (1996-2001) is recognised to have been one of the most constructive phases in 
Armenian-Azeri relations and in the NK conflict resolution efforts.66 Armenia has not asked for 
a change in the Minsk Group format where the EU is not represented. This reveals a perception 
by Yerevan that keeping an old ally in the negotiations – France – is more useful for its 
objectives than would be a EU representation that is much harder to lobby. This amounts to a 
very pragmatic assessment by the Armenian authorities regarding EU involvement: not as 
relevant as to make a difference pushing for a final resolution of the conflict, but still relevant 
enough to develop considerable incentives that might change the status quo. 
The EU, through the promotion of its core values – the so-called ‘transformative power’67 – has 
been welcomed in the South Caucasus. Regional identities have been described as European,68 
and the strong economic, ethic and political appeal of the Union is the most promising project 
available for the area since independence. The ENP represents a real, even if limited, possibility 
to engage with the EU, following the postulates of peace and prosperity. However, diverging 
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views persist among the government and within the opposition. EU involvement was regarded 
as an opportunity to diversify relations and to engage in economic reforms and regional 
integration necessary to sustain a weakened economy. Armenia was never a demandeur state in 
the EU’s neighbourhood and it has kept commitments on a shallow basis, hampering effective 
results of life-quality improvement for Armenian citizens. However, Armenian officials seem to 
understand the possible drastic effects for Armenia’s future of the lack of genuine democratic 
reforms and, conditionality is then presented not only as ‘good’, but even ‘healthy’ for the 
country, as it tries to prove itself “the most democratic in the South Caucasus.”69 Growing 
democratic conditionality linked to the ENP process and the redesign of EU’s financial 
instruments might develop into an important mechanism for reforms, rewarding those truly 
committed to democracy.70 
In addition, the EU is not a strong military actor, with the US and Russian military influence 
remaining central for regional security. The governments of the region are well aware that the 
EU cannot replace the role of these actors. Moreover, they also understand the EU as still 
having to better define its mechanisms for greater involvement in the region, along with its 
strategic guidelines, in order that it moves on from “declarative rhetoric to more practical 
action”.71 This is more so given the fact that the EU is going through a particularly difficult 
period, enlarged to 27 member states and without a political charter to make it more functional – 
it is becoming more diverse and thus more difficult to manage. Divergent perspectives among 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ member states as to the depth of relations with the Eastern neighbours, 
the relations with Russia and the management of the common neighbourhood, as well as EU 
involvement in conflict resolution issues, have exposed the weaknesses of a model still running 
on inter-governmental arrangements. While the ENP as a valued instrument might be capable of 
maintaining the EU neighbours’ interest in reform, this could also prove to be the “litmus test 
for Europeanisation”.72 Two fundamental challenges emerge for the ENP: managing the 
expectations of the neighbourhood and defining the policy’s added value vis-à-vis other 
regional options and other European policies.  
The inclusion of the EU into the Caucasian ‘great game’ must be related to regional perceptions 
regarding external influence. Each regional state has its own understanding of how it can profit 
from the involvement of different external actors. For Georgia, the US is the military 
counterbalance to Russia, since the EU has denied any military involvement in the conflicts and 
even refused to send police members to monitor the Georgian-Russian border after the OSCE’s 
mission was ended by Russia (the small EU Border Support Team – BST Georgia – launched in 
September 2006, includes a group of a few field mentors, experts, operationals and 
administrative staff, in support of the EUSR work in Tbilisi).73 Removal of the remaining 
Russian military bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki has been agreed, but the replacement of the 
CIS peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by an international contingent, are 
urgent demands from Tbilisi, while pushing for NATO membership. For Azerbaijan, the 
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preferred option is no military presence. Cooperation with NATO after September 11 opened 
Azeri territory to the US military, but this could change in case of US-led attacks on Iran. As for 
Armenia, it has drawn on ‘complementarity’ as an appeaser for growing Russian concern about 
US military presence in ‘its backyard’. NATO exercises, authorisation to US flights to 
Afghanistan to cross Armenian air space, and participation in Iraq’s combat forces have proved 
to be compatible with the presence of Russian soldiers along the border with Turkey and Iran, 
despite support for NATO being met with both suspicion and pressure on a domestic level.74  
If for a while Russia’s biggest fear was NATO enlargement to its former area of influence, the 
2004 EU enlargement has made it clear to Moscow that the levels of integration proposed by the 
European model mean a severe limitation to Russian influence. That is to say, that should the 
South Caucasus countries ever be offered an accession perspective, this would demand a more 
serious engagement with the methods and legislation coming from Brussels. The idea that in 
order for cooperation and even integration into the EU to be developed, Russia should adopt 
European rules and standards, and submit its elites to supranational institutions, clashes with the 
perception Russia has of itself and its place in the world.75 EU and Russian perceptions of their 
common security neighbourhood differ: the EU sees it as preventive engagement while Russia 
understands it as fierce competition. The lack of constructive dialogue between Brussels and 
Moscow, and the increasingly inflamed rhetoric between Moscow and Washington could 
impact on the South Caucasus, by placing it on a new fault line.76 
5. The ENP Action Plan: What lies ahead for Armenia? 
Armenia’s ENP Action Plan is based on a bilateral and differentiated approach, as stated in the 
ENP strategy paper issued by the Commission. The goal is to guarantee that each state partner 
has room to advance its own priorities for reform, taking into account geographical location, 
political and economic situation, relations with the EU and neighbouring countries, as well as 
perceived interests, needs and capabilities. However, the basis for cooperation is a clear 
commitment to shared values and regional collaboration.77 Major issues addressed run from 
democracy promotion, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, social 
cohesion and sustainable economic development, through economic legislation convergence and 
improvement of the business climate, to an energy strategy including the decommissioning of 
the Medzamor nuclear power plant. Conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh and regional 
cooperation complete the vast set of issues and objectives the EU has established together with 
Yerevan.78 The negotiation process leading to the conclusion of the Action Plan was a time of 
particular leverage for the EU and it was used to engage the authorities in Baku and Azerbaijan 
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in some level of dialogue, though still not carrying enough pressure to reach agreement. To the 
point that this could be perceived as an attempt to foster regional engagement, it was a strategy 
that provoked much criticism. In fact, it implied inter-state linkage and conditionality in terms 
of the advancement of negotiations, with the regional approach again revealing its limits.79   
The negotiation of the Action Plans for the South Caucasus countries was particularly delicate, 
as the Commission tried to maintain the balance between differentiation and regional 
cooperation.80 A permanent attempt to maintain balance between EU approaches to Armenia 
and Azerbaijan is still valid today, as the EU insists on opening a fully-fledged delegation in 
Yerevan only when it might do the same in Baku. The reasons for such an option, besides 
avoiding further regional instability, are not fully clear. One EU diplomat has put forward a 
‘civilisational’ explanation, underlining that the EU ascribes as much importance to Christian 
Armenia and Georgia as it does to Muslim Azerbaijan.81 This might be true to the extent that the 
EU does not wish to see a moderate Islamic country antagonised unnecessarily, but it does not 
explain why the ENP was extended to Azerbaijan and not to other Islamic countries close to the 
EU such as Iran, for instance. Since the main issue keeping the South Caucasus both linked 
together and torn apart is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is more natural for the EU to 
privilege a regional perspective as a way of bringing all involved actors together and to keep the 
possibilities for conflict resolution open. The final wording of the Armenian and Azeri ENP 
Action plans reflects this search for balance. The final Action Plan for Azerbaijan reads as 
follows:  
[T]he European Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union sets ambitious objectives 
based on mutual commitments of the EU and its Member States and Azerbaijan to common 
values, including the respect of and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
inviolability of internationally recognised borders of each other (…)  
referring to conflict resolution as the first priority.82 In the Armenian Action Plan, there is no 
reference to the principle of territorial integrity and the reference to conflict resolution comes as 
one of the last points. And while reference to the principle of self-determination is added in the 
Armenian document, it is not included in the Azeri Action Plan.83 This is a language game 
demonstrating an effort at finding an acceptable format to the parties, and an attempt not to 
interfere with the basic principles agreed at negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE. 
Clearly the EU does not see itself as having, or wishing to have, a wider role in the NK conflict, 
at least for the time being. 
For those in the neighbourhood, economic benefits could play an important role in mobilising 
the population and political elites for reform, as seems to be the main idea with the incentives 
                                                     
79 Interview with Armen Liloyan, Head of the European Union Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Armenia, Yerevan, 10 May 2006. 
80 Generally speaking, the capability of the EU to differentiate among the South Caucasus states was 
limited. This was particularly visible when the EU suspended the official negotiations of the ENP Action 
Plans with all three South Caucasus countries, due to Azeri flights connecting to northern Cyprus. The 
EU maintains sanctions on that part of the island and regarded the Azeri attitude as running against EU 
interests. This was repeatedly denounced by Georgia and Armenia as an unfair measure, not in line with 
the differentiation principle of the ENP and revealing a preference towards regional formats over 
individual relations. For more detail on this see Freire & Simao (2006), op. cit., p. 10. 
81 Interview with EU Official, Tbilisi, 3 May 2006. 
82 EU/Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan (available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm). 
83 EU/Armenia ENP Action Plan (available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm). 
18 | FREIRE & SIMÃO 
 
for economic integration of ENP countries into the EU Single Market.84 However, if corruption 
and mismanagement of public affairs by elites remain current practice, “vicious circles of 
resistance to economic and political reforms are created”85 and the expected benefits will not be 
visible, considerably diminishing the effectiveness of the integration process.  
This is perceived in some sectors of Armenia’s political sphere, particularly the opposition 
parties, as an issue of particular concern. Economic development and integration into world 
markets is central for Armenia’s security as it faces a blockade from Turkey and Azerbaijan, 
and is becoming increasingly dependent on Russia.86 The major issue is how far dissenting 
voices will be allowed in Armenian political life and the extent to which they will make a 
difference in the strategic choices of the ruling elites. The evolving democratisation process runs 
the risk of being jeopardised and even aborted if economic development is not translated into 
improvement of social conditions, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. It is therefore in the EU’s best interests to put forward democratic governance, rule of 
law, human rights and civil society as the centrepieces of the ENP, while supporting political 
conditionality mechanisms that will make its neighbours comply, acting on the economic appeal 
the EU represents. These two factors – conditionality and socialisation – become the major 
drivers for change towards one of the legal principles binding the EU member states, which is 
the principle of democracy.87 
Plans ahead for a concrete and effective EU policy in the region and an enhancement of ENP 
capabilities might include strengthening of political dialogue, both with partner countries and 
external partners, such as Russia, the US, Turkey and Iran; enhanced economic and political 
benefits; and external assistance programming linked to conditionality.88 A fundamental 
regional dimension is also underlined in the Commission’s Communication “On strengthening 
the European Neighbourhood Policy”, mostly through the enhancement of a Black Sea 
Dimension that became clearer after Bulgaria and Romania accessed the EU. Here the EU 
should enhance internal coordination of its policies to ensure that ENP states, members and 
candidates have equivalent possibilities to cooperate, even if under different policies. This is 
also expected to add leverage to the EU conflict resolution mechanisms.89 A particularly 
worrying trend for Armenia is the development of regional infrastructures like the BTC pipeline 
and the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku railroad, both bypassing Armenian territory, and leaving the 
country out of what is seen as the revival of the Silk Road. Previous efforts to revive this 
                                                     
84 ENP Strategy Paper, op. cit. See also External Relations and Neighbourhood Commissioner Ferrero-
Waldner Speech (2006), “EU in the World”, Brussels, 3 February. 
85 Emerson & Noutcheva (2004), op. cit., p. 17. 
86 Richard Giragosian (2005), Toward a new concept of Armenian National Security, Armenian 
International Policy Research, Working Paper No. 05/07, pp. 10-11. 
87 Michael Emerson, Senem Aydýn, Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci, Marius Vahl and Richard 
Youngs (2005), The Reluctant Debutante: The European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its 
Neighborhood, CEPS Working Document No. 223, CEPS, Brussels, July, p. 4; Elena Bacarani (2004), 
“The EU and Democracy Promotion: A Strategy of Democratization in the Framework of 
Neighborhood”, in Fulvio Attinà & Rosa Rossi (eds), European Neighborhood Policy: Political, 
economic and social issues, Jean Monnet Centre “Euro Med” p. 41. 
88 International Alert (2006), Peacebuilding in the South Caucasus: What can the EU contribute?, 
September, p. 35 (www.international-alert.org). See also Emerson, Noutcheva & Popescu (2007), op. cit.  
89 European Commission communication to the Council and the European Parliament “On strengthening 
the European Neighbourhood Policy”, Brussels, 4 December, COM (2006)726 final. See also Fabrizio 
Tassinari (2006), A synergy for Black Sea regional cooperation: Guidelines for an EU Initiative, CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 105, CEPS, Brussels, June. 
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connection between Europe and Asia, like the TRACECA and INOGATE programmes, were 
hampered by lack of dialogue between Baku and Yerevan, with direct implications for 
Armenian economy and political dealings.  
In order for the ENP to develop into a full strategic initiative from which the EU can derive 
effective power, which in the end means stabilising the countries in its periphery politically, 
economically and in security terms, the refinement of its policies must be pursued. There seems 
to be a growing awareness of the potential of the ENP among European officials, along with the 
unavoidable challenges it must address. Armenia is at the heart of these dynamics: its political 
transition towards democracy could be jeopardised if conditionality and incentives are not 
visible; its economic transition and the much praised economic success needs consolidation, so 
as not to develop into an ‘orchid economy’90 – appealing when looked at from a statistical point 
of view, but growing in a non-sustainable way. In addition, Armenia is a testing ground for the 
development of regional cooperation in the southern Caucasus, for conflict resolution, and for 
the promotion of stable societies capable of driving democracy and modernisation to western 
standards and thus fully integrated into the European security community.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper has looked at the Armenian road to democracy, understanding it as a tortuous 
process defined by internal and external dynamics. These two dimensions – internal policies and 
external factors – have both fostered and hampered the process, which from its very beginning 
has been defined in terms of the Western liberal democracy model. Understanding democracy in 
its broader formulation, the Armenian transition course has revealed many difficulties in 
implementation. Internally, the consolidation of democratic practices at the institutional and 
decision-making levels has shown limits, in a society used to a strong leadership, and where the 
power of the local elite in political and economic terms is substantial. These old-style practices 
render the development of a civil society and the enhancement of rules regarding transparency 
and accountability very difficult. The recurrent use of violence to suppress dissidence and 
opposition is a clear example of political and economic allegiances and of the difficulty to 
establish an independent judiciary. Armenia is thus an incomplete democracy in a regional 
context where democracy as a model has mostly been the exception. Surrounded by 
authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, the so-called ‘managed democracy’ in Russia and the 
arbitrariness in neighbouring countries, with the possible exception of Georgia, underlines a 
view that Armenia’s efforts at reform, such as the recently adopted Constitutional amendments, 
should be acknowledged and supported.  
It is undeniable that there are many internal obstacles to this process. Nevertheless, Armenia’s 
relations with neighbouring countries and the influence of external actors in the area are central 
elements that need to be taken into account. The lack of regional cooperation, due to the 
unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and competition for resources and influence in the area, 
render the geostrategic and political-economic setting highly complex. The lack of diplomatic 
relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey; difficult relations with Georgia; and cooperative relations 
with Iran and Russia, despite elements of divergence, render the whole picture bleak. In 
addition, the EU and the US have also become engaged in the South Caucasus, providing 
economic, political and even military assistance. From this wide involvement, a complex net of 
bargaining, concessions and trading of power has emerged. The reconciliation of divergent 
interests and competing opportunities, along with the challenge of fostering positive cooperative 
                                                     
90 Dov Lynch’s expression used at the EPC Conference on “Bringing peace & stability to the South 
Caucasus: The role of the EU”, Brussels, 1 March 2007. 
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dynamics have proven very hard indeed. In this context, the ENP might be an important catalyst 
for change both within Armenia and regarding regional cooperation, since the approach in 
Yerevan is ‘benefit driven’, through a rational assessment, and not simply a feeling of 
euphoria.91 By enhancing economic cooperation based on a set of agreed principles shared by all 
ENP countries, it might establish a common platform to translate minimal shared procedures 
into action, with positive input. Implementing a set of norms and practices according to the EU 
model, as earlier defined – Europeanisation – establishes common patterns and consists of a 
simple download of ‘ways of doing’ that might in the end turn out to be too removed from 
present Armenian political dynamics. 
The scenarios are therefore varied, but an optimistic stance can be taken. Transition should be 
understood as a long-term process, which takes time to take root but which might assist in 
stabilising the region. By bringing with it deep reforms and the goal of developing regional 
cooperation, it might constitute an important confidence-building measure to end the Karabakh 
conflict, which is a fundamental obstacle to the normalisation of relations in the area. In the 
process, the role of the elites in power should not be underestimated as a blocking force to 
reforms that might undermine particular interests. However, offering prospects of new 
economic opportunities might also constitute an enhancing factor. Russia’s influence in the 
South Caucasus has diminished, particularly in Georgia, but also in Azerbaijan. This has been 
mostly due to the perception of new options for the region, such as the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, understood in Moscow as a counterweight to its influence. Armenian leaders have 
sought to keep all options open by their policy of complementarity, often linking strategies of 
personal political survival to the fate of the Armenian nation in a perceived hostile environment. 
Russia can thus be seen as a maintainer of the status quo, namely regarding conflict resolution 
issues, though to what extent this plays to its advantage in the long-run is not clear. The US is 
another relevant player, and its military and energy interests in the Caucasian countries have 
worked as a solid and credible basis for EU engagement in the region, aligning the Euro-
Atlantic partnership. However, issues concerning US military intervention in Iraq and the 
management of the Iranian crisis are still major problems that can affect the strategic 
engagement of the West in the South Caucasus. In addition, US relations with Russia and with 
Turkey are also of much relevance regarding the region’s balance of power, and for the EU. 
In a nutshell, the complexity of interactions, interests and necessary reforms has rendered 
democratisation a difficult process in Armenia. The commitment to western liberal democracy, 
though appearing to be highly rhetorical has, nevertheless, been supported by Armenia’s 
participation in international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and OSCE, and in the 
neighbourhood policy of the EU. Expectations are therefore rising as to the effective results of 
Armenia’s post-communist transition and to the role external players can have in the wider 
strategic setting in the Caucasus. The Armenian democratisation process looks troubled, with 
such a complex set of divergent and competing interests, but there are nevertheless identifiable 
areas for cooperation, which if exploited might open new windows of opportunity for Armenia. 
The EU, through the ENP, and its particular concretisation in the Action Plan for Armenia, 
might just be opening one of these windows. 
                                                     
91 Interview with Erik Gulasian, AEPLAC, Yerevan, Armenia, 12 May 2006. 
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